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Why do I think it appropriate to develop this point of view at this confer-
ence organized by Globelics?
1 I believe that evolutionary economic theory,
along with the appreciation of the complex nature of modern economic
institutions, lies at the conceptual heart of the Globelics Project. My good
friend and colleague, Giovanni Dosi, has proposed that evolutionary eco-
nomic theory is “economic theory done right.” I think there is a lot to that
position. However, it clearly needs some unpacking and argument.
The implicit alternative to evolutionary economic theory of course is mod-
ern neoclassical theory. In order to make my case, and unpack Giovanni’s
proposal, I need to lay out what I think are the key differences.
The Basic Differences
At the broadest level, and possibly the deepest, the difference between the
evolutionary economic theory that is taking shape, and the neoclassical the-
ory that has dominated microeconomic theorizing over the last thirty years,
is that evolutionary theory sees the economy as always in the process of
change, with economic activity almost always proceeding in a context that
is not completely familiar to the actors, or perfectly understood by them. In
contrast, neoclassical theory sees the economy as at rest, or undergoing
well anticipated change, in any case with actions appropriate to the context
something the decision makers have learned through relevant experience,
or can calculate accurately based on what they know securely. In turn, this
difference in the way the economic scene is interpreted leads to important
differences in the operational parts of the theories.
I will not discuss here the differences in the styles of formal modeling in the
two theories, save to note that formal modeling in evolutionary theory tends
to take the form of dynamic systems that at any moment may be far from
an equilibrium, while formal neoclassical models almost always assume that
an equilibrium obtains. My focus here is not on formal modeling, but on
what Sidney Winter and I have called “appreciative theory”, that is theory
that aims to capture the basics of what actually is going on.
One basic difference between the theories is in the way economic behav-
ior is understood. Both theories assume that individual and organizational
economic actors pursue objectives, usually in a reasonably intelligent way.
However, the “rationality” of actors in evolutionary theory is, on the one
hand, bounded, but on the other hand, potentially creative and innovative.
This is a very different view of economic behavior than one that presumes
1 Paper prepared for the Second International Globelics Conference, Beijing, 16-20 October 2004. that the actors face given and fully understood choice sets, and make opti-
mal choices given in those sets. The latter may make sense if one could
assume that the economic context is basically unchanging, that economic
actors have had sufficient experience to learn what works and what does-
n’t in that context, and that there has been sufficient time for selection to
winnow out or force transformation of incompetent behavior. But if the eco-
nomic context tends to be in flux, with change coming both from changes
in external conditions and from developments internal to the operation of
the system, such a presumption is misleading. It blinds analysis to the fact
that economic actors in many cases may operate in ways that have suf-
ficed in the past, but which may be far from the best that can be done in
given current conditions. It misses the uncertain groping that almost always
characterizes individual and organizational action taking in contexts that are
poorly understood, and the fact that individual and organizational actors
often can and do behave in innovative ways.
Bengt Ake Lundvall has proposed that the economy should be regarded as
a learning system, with the presumption that the learning is always going
on, or should be. That is exactly the perspective of evolutionary economic
theory.
A related difference is in how the two theories conceive good economic
performance. Neoclassical theory proposes that economic performance
should be judged in terms of how close it is to a theoretical optimum.
Evolutionary theory sees performance in terms of economic progress. 
The perspective of modern evolutionary economic theory scarcely is a rad-
ical new departure. Indeed Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, was
basically concerned with illuminating the processes of economic develop-
ment, and the institutions supporting the key processes. Much of his com-
parative analysis was concerned with identifying the reasons why some
countries seemed to have been making significant progress, while others
seemed stagnant. This orientation towards economic progress, the factors
stimulating progress, and those limiting it, remained central in economic
analysis, until the development of neoclassical theory pulled the focus more
sharply towards the properties of a hypothetical economic equilibrium.
I also want to note, or rather to highlight, that most of the useful under-
standings that are contained in modern economics are not tied to modern
neoclassical theory. Propositions like “demand is responsive to price”,
“competition tends to keep prices in line with costs”, “an economy in which
markets play a significant role has a capacity for self-organization and adap-
tation to changes in basic economic conditions”, and “attempts to give
detailed direction to an economy from the center tend to be incompetent or
3worse”, are not dependent on “theorems” derived from modern neoclassi-
cal economic theory. You will find all of the above in Adam Smith, over 200
years ago.
Modern economists tend to be pragmatic and flexible when they are doing
empirical research, and engaging in serious policy discussion, or at least the
best of them are. Does this mean that it really does not matter whether the
theory articulated and taught, as formal theory, is neoclassical or evolu-
tionary? I think it does matter. In the first place, while empirically oriented
economists partially can escape the grip of neoclassical theory in the
research and analysis they do, holding that theory still makes it difficult to
appreciate the nature and role of innovation in economic activity, as vari-
ous attempts to force innovation into a maximizing framework attest. It
makes it difficult to recognize adequately that analyzing the behavior and
performance of economic actors in a hypothetical equilibrium is not a good
way to understand what is going on in contexts that clearly are out of equi-
librium and in flux. In contrast, the perspective of modern evolutionary the-
ory provides a framework that is helpful in analysis of economic dynamics. 
Second, the theory one holds influences the empirical literature with which
one is familiar. Scholars who hold strongly to neoclassical theory qua theo-
ry tend not to know about the extensive empirical literature on economic
dynamics that has been the work of evolutionary economists, and which is
published in journals and other outlets that draw in articles by economists
who do not adhere to neoclassical theory. I am struck, for example, that my
neoclassical colleagues who write about technological advance as the driv-
ing force behind economic growth tend not to be aware of Research Policy
or Industrial and Corporate Change where, in my view, much of the most
interesting empirical work on firm and industry dynamics is being published.
Of course the evolutionary theory I am talking about is strongly
Schumpeterian. It is interesting, and relevant, that in his Theory of
Economic Development, Schumpeter used the concept of a circular flow
equilibrium, where habitual, customary, behavior sufficed, indeed was haz-
ardous to abandon, as the vehicle to contrast with what is involved in eco-
nomic development, where innovation was driving change, and the system
was out of equilibrium. Schumpeter’s conception of behavior in the circular
flow was his interpretation of Walrasian general equilibrium, and an inter-
esting way of characterizing the conditions under which modern neoclassi-
cal economics would be a good characterization of what was going on, par-
ticularly if maximizing behavior is interpreted, as it was by Milton Friedman,
as a way of “predicting” and describing behavior that has been winnowed
by learning and competition. I note that modern economic evolutionary the-
ory becomes very similar to neoclassical theory, and generates a continu-
4ing equilibrium “circular flow” of economic activity, when innovation is shut
down for an extended period of time. But Schumpeter’s basic point was
that, if innovation is an important part of what is going on, this characteri-
zation of economic activity is inappropriate.
I would like to highlight a particular aspect of Schumpeter’s treatment of
innovation in his Theory of Economic Development, that he carries over into
his later Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, because it is a central ele-
ment of evolutionary theory. It is the presence of uncertainty. 
I note here that Schumpeter’s concept of uncertainty is close to that of
Frank Knight; absence of sufficient relevant experience for the actor to esti-
mate relevant probabilities reliably, or even to list in any detail the states of
affairs that might materialize after an action is taken. The essence of trying
something new, of innovation, is that what will happen is uncertain in this
sense, with success never a sure thing. And where and when a consider-
able amount of innovation is going on, being done by different economic
actors, the current context is particular uncertain. In such a context, con-
siderable progress may be being made by the economy as a whole, but
through a process of “creative destruction” that involves losers as well as
winners. The evolutionary economic theory that Sidney Winter and I helped
to develop, as an alternative to neoclassical theory, was strongly inspired
by Schumpeter. 
However, there is an important blind spot in Schumpeter, that also was
there to some degree in the early articulations of evolutionary economic the-
ory, that I would like to flag here, because in my mind Globelics provides
an antidote to that early limitation. It is failure to recognize in the theoreti-
cal structure the institutional complexities of modern market economies. Of
course the same problem is there in neoclassical economic theory. Indeed
one explanation for the institutional oversimplification in Schumpeter and in
early evolutionary theory is that Walrasian general equilibrium theory had
too strong an influence on the writers whom, in other respects, were
rebelling against that theory. Recognize that the institutional structure in
general equilibrium theory is very spare. There are firms, who employ inputs
to produce outputs. There are households who supply primary inputs and
who purchase final outputs. And there are markets that somehow work,
through the adjusting of prices, to equilibrate supply and demand. That’s it!
The innovation systems strand of research, which is at the heart of
Globelics, is designed to enrich this overly spare institutional picture. It does
so in two somewhat distinct, but overlapping ways. One is to recognize the
complexity of many market relationships, their embedding in broader social
and institutional structures, and the elements of cooperation and trust that
5often are essential if markets are to work well. Lundvall and his colleagues
have been emphasizing these aspects, particular in the context of buyer-
seller interactions in certain important economic sectors. The other is to
highlight the role of non-market institutions, like university and public
research systems, scientific and technical societies, government programs,
in the innovation process in many sectors. While there has been a tenden-
cy in the innovation systems literature to focus on institutions involved in
the early stages of the innovation process, particularly R and D, some treat-
ments also include in the innovation system the labor market, the education
system, financial institutions, regulatory structures, and other institutions
that shape economic dynamics more broadly.
Particularly the latter strand makes the research on innovation systems very
much part of the recent broad movement in economics to develop a new
institutional economics. While sometimes not recognized for what it is, this
is a major step away from the Walrasian model. However, I think it fair to
say that there are significant differences between the adherents to a richer
institutional view who, in other regards, try to hold on to the basic tenets
of neoclassical theory, and those coming from evolutionary economics,
who thus far mostly have been associated with the innovation systems
writings.
Those differences are exactly the ones I flagged earlier. The neoclassical
economists tend to see institutions as created through and operating as
they do because of the maximizing behavior of economic agents, and pre-
vailing institutions as an equilibrium configuration. In contrast, evolutionary
economists tend to see the institutional structure as always evolving.
Evolutionary Economic Theory as Growth Theory
The empirical research during the 1950s and 1960s on the sources of
macroeconomic growth firmly established that technological advance was
the key driving force. These findings led to a surge of research by econo-
mists on the processes of technological advance, and to the rediscovery of
the features of economic activity where innovation was important that had
been argued years before by Schumpeter. It continues to puzzle and sad-
den me that so many of my colleagues in economics interested in economic
growth continue to hold onto a neoclassical growth theory that cannot deal
adequately with an economic context in which innovation is important.
The evolutionary growth models that I and my colleagues developed in the
1980s were, I think, a significant step towards the development of a viable
theoretical alternative. However, as I mentioned above, those early evolu-
tionary analyses lacked a way of seeing onto the complex institutional
structures that characterize modern economies. 
6I think that, as a result of the bringing of institutions under the umbrella of
evolutionary theory, evolutionary economics now has the capability to pro-
vide a broad, coherent, and useful theory of economic growth as experi-
enced in the advanced industrial economies. A satisfactory growth theory
of course has to be able to make sense out of the aggregate time series of
output, measured by real GNP, and aggregate inputs like labor and physical
and human capital. The early evolutionary growth models showed that a
growth theory based on evolutionary economics could do this as well as a
growth theory based on neoclassical economics. 
But I would argue that a satisfactory growth theory has to do a lot more
than just that. A satisfactory growth theory should be able to illuminate the
important details of growth, qualitative as well as quantitative, that one
sees in the accounts of economic historians. And a satisfactory theory
needs to specify correctly the basic processes driving economic growth.
Otherwise that theory does not explain what actually is happening. 
The new evolutionary growth theory that is emerging sees economic
growth as the result of the coevolution of technologies, firm and industry
structures, and supporting and governing institutions. I propose that a sat-
isfactory theory of the processes involved in economic growth must con-
sider all three of these aspects, and that the driving dynamics involves their
interaction. To illustrate, it is useful to consider several empirical cases.
I begin by considering the revolution in pharmaceuticals that has occurred
over the last forty years, particularly in the United States. The development
during the 1960s and 1970s of molecular biology as a strong science, and
the creation of the basic processes used in modern biotechnology, clearly
was a watershed. These developments opened up a new route to pharma-
ceuticals discovery and development, one in which, at least at the start,
established pharmaceuticals companies had no particular competences, and
at the same time, one where certain academic researchers had particular
expertise. Several lines of university based research began to appear com-
mercially very promising. A number of new biotech firms were formed,
staffed by university researchers and their students, with plans to develop
new pharmaceuticals, and either license the successful results or them-
selves go further downstream into the pharmaceuticals business. 
There were two institutional factors that enabled and encouraged these
developments. One was the traditional openness of American universities
to entrepreneurial activity on the part of their researchers. The other was
an established venture capital industry, which quickly came to see the
finance of biotech start-ups as a potentially profitable business.
7In 1980 a key legal decision assured skeptics that the products of biotech
could be patented. At the same time, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole act,
which encouraged universities to take out patents on the results of their
government funded research projects, and to try aggressively to commer-
cialize those results. This latter development was accompanied by growing
support of the National Institutes of Health for research at universities in the
relevant fields, under the expectation that universities would actively
engage in patenting of research results and efforts to spur commercializa-
tion. These developments strongly reinforced the developing structure that
I have described above. 
The pharmaceuticals industry has changed in many ways since the times I
have just described. However, there would be widespread agreement that
these developments set the stage for an era of high productivity of phar-
maceuticals research, albeit with apparent diminishing returns in recent
years, and for U. S. dominance in commercial biotech, which holds to the
present time.
Let me turn now to another example, our understanding of which is large-
ly due to the work of Alfred Chandler. As Chandler tells the story, the devel-
opment towards the middle of the 19th century of telegraph and railroad
technology opened the possibility of business firms to market their products
over a much larger geographical area, and along with the advances that
were being made at the same time in the ability to design and build large
scale machinery, opened up the possibilities for significant economies of
scale and scope. However, to exploit these opportunities, firms had to be
much larger than had been the norm, and large size posed significant prob-
lems of both organization and management. The organizational problem
was solved by the emergence of the modern hierarchically organized com-
pany, and later by the multi divisional form of organization. But to manage
these huge companies required many more high level managers than an
owner could garner by canvassing family and friends, which had been the
usual practice. The notion of professional management came into being,
and shortly after Business Schools emerged as the institutional mechanism
for training professional managers. The financial needs of the giant compa-
nies were beyond what could be met through existing financial institutions,
and both modern investment banks and modern stock markets emerged to
meet the needs.
All of these developments raised complicated issues of corporate, labor,
and financial law. Gradually these were worked out. At the same time the
market power of the new large firms, and their tendency to collude with
each other, gave rise to new regulatory law and anti trust.
8Another interesting example is the rise of the organic chemical product
industry in Germany, as told by Peter Murmann. Here the initiating cause
was a breakthrough in the science of organic chemistry. As a result, per-
sons with advanced training in the theory and techniques of chemistry had
a special capability for developing synthetic dyestuffs. In order to take
advantage of this new capability, business firms had to develop the con-
cept and structure of the industrial research laboratory, as a place where
university trained scientists could work with their peers in discovering and
developing new products. And the German university system had to gear
itself up to train significant numbers of chemists inclined to work for indus-
try. The various German governments provided significant funding to enable
this latter development to happen.
All three of the above accounts are of a piece of the economy, not the
whole, although the developments Chandler described had very widespread
impact. I firmly believe that economic growth cannot be understood as an
undifferentiated aggregate phenomena, but rather one needs to understand
an economy as consisting of many different sectors each with their own
dynamic.
However, I also believe that there is a lot to Schumpeter’s theory, present-
ed in his Business Cycles, that the history of economic growth tends to
divide up into eras, and that within any particular era there is a relatively
small set of technologies and industries that are driving economic growth.
Schumpeter’s theory clearly involves the coevolution of technology, and
firm and industry structure. Recently Carlotta Perez and Christopher
Freeman have proposed that the key technologies and industries of differ-
ent eras generally require different sets of supporting institutions. Their
argument is that the nations that tend to be leaders in the different eras are
those that had, or managed to build, the appropriate set of institutions.
In the discussion above I have tried to highlight several things. First, once
one pays attention to the details, one virtually is forced to take an evolu-
tionary perspective on economic dynamics. A framework that assumes full
rational decision making, and a context of continuing equilibrium, is of no
use at all. Second, the stories presented above involve in an essential way
the coevolution of technology, firm and industry structures, and a variety
of non-market institutions. An account limited to the Walrasian actors
would miss much of the important action. Third, public policies and pro-
grams, including the development of law, are an essential part of the
dynamic. 
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I propose that these same features also are there in the rapid economic
development of countries, originally far behind the frontier, who have
broadly caught up. Successful development involves the coevolution of
technologies employed, firm and industry structure, and broader economic
institutions. Government policies and programs are an essential part of the
picture, for better or for worse, but inevitably. 
For countries aiming to catch up, the basic challenge is to learn to master
new ways of doing things. This involves breaking from the circular flow of
economic activity that Schumpeter used as his base concept for defining
what he meant by innovation. In Schumpeter’s sense of the term, catch up
requires innovation. The innovation involved in catch up is not what econ-
omists studying technological advance in countries at the frontier tend to
mean by the term. The innovation in catching up involves bringing in and
learning to master ways of doing things that may have been used for some
time in the advanced economies of the world, even though they are new
for the country or region catching up. In most cases there are models in
advanced countries that can serve as targets for emulation, and in many
cases active assistance is available in developing the new capability. In
some cases important aspects of the model can be simply imported.  
But bringing into operation practices that are new in the context involves
an essential break from Schumpeter’s circular flow of customary activity.
The record is clear that there is considerable learning that needs to be done
to enable the new modes of operation to be got under effective control, and
a high chance of failure. These are the hallmarks of innovation, at least in
evolutionary economic theory.
Neoclassical growth theory misses all of this. In a recent article Howard
Pack and I argued that neoclassical theory sees economic development as
largely driven by accumulation – investments in physical and human capi-
tal. In contrast, we argue that the key driving force of catch-up is assimila-
tion, learning to do effectively what countries at the frontier have been
doing, often for some time. We recognize, of course, that countries behind
the frontier that have made successful progress in closing the gap have
been marked by high rates of investments in physical and human capital.
These were needed to bring in the new ways of doing things, but not suf-
ficient. The premise of neoclassical theory is that, if the investments are
made, the acquisition and mastery of new ways of doing things is relative-
ly easy, even automatic. The experience of some of the Communist
economies in the period between 1960 and 1990 shows how wrong is this
presumption. High rates of investment, without effective assimilation,
10inevitably result in low returns to those investments, and little in the way
of effective development. 
In contrast, Pack and I argue that the driving force of successful catch-up
is innovation, in the sense described above. Successful innovation requires
access to physical and human capital. However, to a considerable extent,
innovation and effective learning tend to draw supplies of physical and
human capital by enabling their rates of return to be high. Of course, if a
country does not have the institutional structure that enables physical and
human capital to be drawn to, or created for, promising innovative efforts,
innovation will be scotched. But as we read the successful histories of
catch-up in Japan early in the twentieth century, and Korea and Taiwan
toward the close of the twentieth century, it was innovation that was driv-
ing the process, proceeding in an environment where supplies of physical
and human capital were available and forthcoming if the returns were high.
Much of the standard discussion about what is needed for catch-up focus-
es on the need for access to and achievement of mastery over modern tech-
nologies. I would like to propose that that job today is in some ways easi-
er and in some ways more difficult than it was when Korea and Taiwan
were successfully taking aboard modern technologies. It is easier because
the body of relatively codified knowledge underlying most important tech-
nologies has become much stronger than was the case, say, thirty years
ago, and much of that knowledge can be garnered through training, some-
times advanced training, in the relevant sciences and engineering disci-
plines. The need for technological apprenticeship in, or tutelage by, com-
panies in the leading countries, therefore, has diminished. I am not arguing
that a freshly MIT trained engineer, or a Ph.D. scientist, can step right in
and be effective in the operation of a modern technology. However, that
training provides a substantial base for learning by doing and using. From
this point of view, technological catch-up is easier today than it was fifty
years ago.
But from another point of view, it is harder. There is, first of all, greater
need for large scale public and private investments to create a technologi-
cally sophisticated cadre of indigenous engineers and applied scientists.
While in the early stages of catch-up much of the needed technical sophis-
tication can be gained by sending students to study abroad, as development
proceeds, and the sheer quantity of needed engineers and scientists
increases, a large share of the education is going to have to be undertaken
indigenously. I propose that in the current environment, catch up will be
impossible unless a country builds up its education system, from bottom to
top. This poses a major challenge both for financing, and for institution
building.
11In addition, in today’s world, countries seeking to catch up technologically
will be operating under a much more restrictive regulatory regime defined
by international treaties than was the case earlier. TRIPs makes copying, or
appearing to copy, much more hazardous in terms of generating lawsuits
and diplomatic pressure than used to be the case. And at the same time,
treaties enforced through the WTO significantly narrow the range of gov-
ernment policies of protection and subsidy that can be undertaken in sup-
port of infant industry. It is interesting, and I think highly relevant, that
these treaties do leave room for support of training, and certain kinds of
research and development. But to take advantage of this opening poses a
major institutional challenge.
Successful catch-up involves much more than simply gaining mastery over
new technologies, and building up a technologically sophisticated work
force to work with them. Just as new wine seldom goes in old bottles, the
new technologies taken aboard call for new ways of organizing and man-
aging work, and the experience of earlier episodes of successful catch up
indicates that to achieve this involves a painful process of creative destruc-
tion. As Japan took aboard more advanced technologies in the early years
of the twentieth century, and Korea and Taiwan did in the later years, the
economic structures of these countries were transformed. New firms and
whole new industries were founded. Old firms and industries disappeared.
Once can see the same developments happening in China today.
Achieving the needed reforms in economic structure may well be a more
difficult task than gaining the scientific and engineering knowledge needed
to operate the new technologies.  There are several reasons.
One is the political power of old firms and industries, and the difficulties
they may have in transforming themselves. For comfortable, politically well
connected old firms creative destruction is not a welcome thing. Politically
and socially, creative destruction is not easy to handle.
Another reason is that the modes of organization and management in suc-
cessful companies in advanced countries generally are more difficult to imi-
tate, or to transfer, than the technologies that they are using. Unlike the sit-
uation regarding technologies where, I have argued, an increasing share of
the relevant knowledge has become codified, successful large organizations
remain very difficult to understand, much less to imitate. Various pieces of
the modern management literature suggest strongly that managers of suc-
cessful companies may have hazy, or even wrongheaded, notions as to
why their own companies are doing well. And various studies have indi-
cated strongly that effective organizational structures and management
styles come into existence as least as much through internal evolutionary
processes, as through conscious planning.
12It is interesting that while in recent years there have been a number of
empirical studies of the processes through which countries, and firms in
countries, that have been successful in catch-up and have come to master
modern technologies, there has been very little detailed study of the
process of transformation of firm and industry structure. Clearly a number
of different routes have been successfully taken. Korea self-consciously
opted for an industry structure involving large, diversified firms. The
Taiwanese industrial structure that has been successful in modernization
has involved medium-size firms, and continuing new firm entry. Some coun-
tries like Korea have held off direct foreign investment. Others like
Singapore have welcomed it. All of these countries, however, seem to have
been effective in creating a firm and industry structure that could success-
fully organize and manage modern technologies. Other countries have been
much less successful at this. It would be extremely interesting to learn more
about the differences.
Of course the rate and effectiveness of the needed changes in firm and
industry structure, as well as the vigor and effectiveness of efforts to adopt
and master new technologies, depends on the institutional structures sup-
porting and molding economic activity, and the extent to which they facili-
tate productive change. Despite the growing influence of the new institu-
tional economics, much of the analysis of development done from a neo-
classical perspective continues to see the needed supporting institutional
structures as very simple, basically those that support efficient market
organized economic activity as viewed through neoclassical theoretical
glasses. Thus there is emphasis on a well drawn and well enforced code of
commercial law, strong intellectual property rights, a distancing of govern-
ment from market economic activity with policies aimed to let the market
work, fiscal and monetary policies that support productive investment and
avoid inflation, etc. There may be some talk about the role of government
in providing needed infrastructure, particularly in the field of education, but
I have seen no coherent discussion of this.
As the examples presented in the preceding section show, the institutional
context within which economic growth proceeds in high income countries
is much richer, and active, than the standard neoclassical picture. This cer-
tainly also seems to be the case in the experiences of successful catch up.
As I indicated earlier, I am using the term innovation system to encompass
the wide range of institutions that are involved in supporting and orienting
the dynamics of economic activity where innovation is the key driving
force. In my discussion above, I have identified a number of institutions that
strike me as absolutely key to the catch-up process. One is the education
system, from the basics, to the part engaged in advanced training in sci-
13ence and technology, and the other bodies of knowledge and skill needed
to operate modern economies. Creative restructure of financial systems is
pivotal. Since the catch-up process involves a significant shifting of
resources away from old firms and industries, the financial system must
enable this transfer.  
However, I want to conclude this section by calling attention to, that is all
I have time to do, another part of the institutional structure needed for
catch-up in the 21st century – the research system of universities and pub-
lic laboratories. While overlooked in much of the writings on economic
development, indigenous research long has been an important element of
catch-up in certain fields.  
This is certainly so in agriculture, and here agricultural economists have pro-
vided a considerable amount of analysis and evidence. It also would appear
to be true regarding medicine, although I have not been able to find much
in the way of systematic study here. An important part of the reason in
both of these fields is that in these areas developing countries often could
not simply copy technology and practice in countries at the frontier, but
needed to develop technologies suited to their own conditions. Soil and cli-
mate conditions tend to be different. The prevalent diseases were different.
There is every reason to believe that the importance of having a capability
to do effective research and development in agriculture and medicine will
be as important in the future as it has been in the past. In these areas, inter-
national institutions have played important roles in the past, and will con-
tinue to do so in the future. But I suspect strongly that there are major
advantages to a country in building up its own research capabilities in these
areas.
In contrast with agriculture and medicine, while in manufacturing the tech-
nologies used in advanced countries may not have been optimal, at least
they worked in the new setting with often modest modification. And they
were generally available. The experience of countries that have successful-
ly caught up in manufacturing over the past half-century testifies to the
importance of a nation’s university system in providing a supply of trained
engineers and applied scientists for manufacturing firms’ catching up.
However, while there are interesting exceptions (electronics in Taiwan, and
aircraft in Brazil, are examples), it is not clear that research per se in uni-
versities and national laboratories has played an important role in catch-up
in manufacturing, beyond its role in the training function.
I would like to argue that circumstances have changed. Earlier I noted both
the new international regimes’ stronger protection of intellectual property,
and the apparent leeway under WTO rules for certain kinds of public
14research. There is no question in my mind that for countries aiming to catch
up, developing the capabilities for learning and innovation in firms is the
heart of the challenge. However, a strong system of university and public
labs research can play a very important supporting role.
Building such a system is not easy. An effective program partly involves
getting the basic design right. Roberto Mazzoleni and I presently are
engaged in research concerned with identifying the key aspects of public
research systems that enable them to contribute to the development of eco-
nomic capabilities. But building an effective system involves much more
than having a plausible plan… I, and the other originators of the Innovation
system concept have argued that while national systems clearly are shaped
by policies, it is a mistake to see these systems as having been “planned”
in any detail. Rather, they evolved.  
The evolution of institutions presently is the least well developed part of an
emerging evolutionary economics. Understanding better the processes of
institutional evolution, and how those processes interact with the evolution
of technologies and firm and industry structures, may be the key to under-
standing the processes of economic catch-up.
The Case for an Evolutionary Theory of Economic Catch-up
I want to conclude this essay by reflecting briefly on the role of theory in
economic analysis, and the case for an evolutionary economic theory. I pro-
pose that theory in economics exists at several different levels of abstrac-
tion. Sidney Winter and I have highlighted the difference between what we
called ”appreciative” and ”formal” theory, with the former mostly
expressed verbally, and much closer to the empirical details of the subject
matter than the latter, and the latter articulated more abstractly, often in
the form of a mathematical model, and more amenable to logical exploration
and manipulation. While current use of the term ”theory” in economics has
tended to identify with formal theory, we argued that in economics most of
the empirical research and interpretation of empirical phenomena was struc-
tured by appreciative theory. 
We also argued that an important condition for progress in understanding
empirical phenomena was that appreciative theorizing be able to draw on
formal theory, which in turn required that formal theory be in tune with
appreciative theory regarding the basic economic processes and contexts
involved. In my discussion towards the start of this essay, I proposed that,
in fact, in much of empirical research in economics, the researcher does not
draw from, or even stick with, the canons of formal neoclassical theory.
Rather there is recognition, explicit or implicit, that economic actors often
15are not in a position to “maximize” in any meaningful sense of that term,
generally because the situation is in flux, and the best action highly uncer-
tain, in the sense of Frank Knight and Joseph Schumpeter. The case for
evolutionary economic theory is that it would be better if that recognition
were explicit.
Economic development obviously involves change in an essential way; that
is what the process is all about. It involves economic actors taking actions
that break from previous behaviors, and an environment in continuing flux
because of the innovating that is going on. Neoclassical theory has nothing
to say about these kinds of conditions. On the other hand, they are exact-
ly the conditions assumed in an evolutionary theory. For that reason, I
believe that progress in understanding the processes of economic catch-up
has to proceed under the implicit or explicit guidance of an evolutionary eco-
nomic theory. That progress will be easier and faster if that guidance is
explicit.
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Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics 
The Other Canon Foundation, Norway, and the Technology Governance
program at Tallinn University of Technology (TUT), Estonia, have launched
a new working papers series, entitled “Working Papers in Technology
Governance and Economic Dynamics”.  In the context denoted by the title
series, it will publish original research papers, both practical and theoretical,
both narrative and analytical, in the area denoted by such concepts as
uneven economic growth, techno-economic paradigms, the history and the-
ory of economic policy, innovation strategies, and the public management
of innovation, but also generally in the wider fields of industrial policy,
development, technology, institutions, finance, public policy, and econom-
ic and financial history and theory.
The idea is to offer a venue for quickly presenting interesting papers –
scholarly articles, especially as preprints, lectures, essays in a form that
may be developed further later on – in a high-quality, nicely formatted ver-
sion, free of charge: all working papers are downloadable for free from
http://hum.ttu.ee/tg as soon as they appear, and you may also order a free
subscription by e-mail attachment directly from the same website.
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